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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the relation between vertical integration and video game per-
formance in the US video game industry. For this purpose, we use a widely used data set from NPD
on video game montly sales from October 2000 to October 2007. We complement these data with
handly collected information on video game developers for all games in the sample and the timing
of all mergers and acquisitions during that period. By doing this, we are able to separate vertically
integrated games from those that are just exclusive to a platform. First, we show that vertically in-
tegrated games produce higher revenues and sell more units at higher prices than independent games.
Second, we explore the causal eﬀect of vertical integration and find that, for the average integrated
game, most of the diﬀerence in performance comes from better release and marketing strategies that
soften competition and not from ex-ante diﬀerences in video game quality. We also find that exclusiv-
ity is associated with lower demand. Our estimates suggest that consumers value vertical integration
features in their games between 4 and 34 dollars per game.
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1 Introduction
The study of the determinants of the boundaries of the firm is an important area of research in
Economics. This started oﬀ with Coase (1937) and extended through the works of Transaction
Cost Economics theories (e.g. Williamson, 1975,1985 and Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978),
Property Rights theories (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart, 1995), and incentive-based
theories (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, 1994). These wide variety of theories have left many
untested predictions and a scarce empirical literature exploring the prevalence and impact of vertical
integration in a determinate set of industries. Recently, Lafontaine and Slade (2009) provide an
extensive summary of this literature and strongly emphasize the need for more empirical studies on
the causes and consequences of vertical integration. In this paper, we extend the existing literature
by studying the impact of vertical integration and exclusivity on game performance in the US video
game industry.
Even though this industry has been studied before by others, in the past the analysis has mainly
focused on both pricing and marketing strategies (see Nair, 2007 or Chiou, 2009) as well as the
role of network eﬀects (see Prieger and Hu, 2006 and Corts and Lederman, 2009). In this paper we
focus our analysis on the impact of vertical integration and exclusivity on video game performance.
Existing studies have mainly focused on vertical integration between publishers and platforms while
proxying vertical integration with software exclusivity (Lee, 2008 and Derdenger, 2008). Due to the
existing high correlation between exclusivity and vertical integration, this approximation may not
be bad if the goal of the study is to quantify the impact of network eﬀects on hardware demand.
Nevertheless, this approximation may be misleading if the final goal is to understand the role of
vertical integration (as opposed to exclusivity) in video game production and video game demand.
In our paper we alleviate this problem by collecting information that separates vertically integrated
games from platform-exclusive games and provide new evidence on the impact of vertical integration
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in the US video game industry.
The data that we use is from NPD on monthly video game sales in the U.S. between October
2000 and October 2007. This data set (widely used by others studying network eﬀects in this
industry) contains information on video game sales and revenues, as well as game publisher and
platform and video game genre. We obtain average monthly price by dividing revenues by sales
in the US. This data set contains information for all video games for all platforms in both 6th
and 7th generation. In addition to this, we complement the information in this data set in two
ways. First, we collected information from several industry webpages that detail the identity of the
developer of each game (unavailable in the NPD data set). Second, we collected information from
several publications regarding all mergers and acquisitions in the US video game industry between
October 2000 and October 2007.
Previous papers on the video games industry (Clements and Ohashi, 2005; Lee, 2008; Der-
denger, 2009; Corts and Lederman, 2007) focused on the importance of (direct or indirect) network
eﬀects on platform demand and platform competition. We analyze a diﬀerent issue. We want to
estimate diﬀerences in video game performance due to vertical integration of platform, publishing
and developing companies. One may imagine various reasons why vertical integration should mat-
ter for video game performance. Vertically integrated games might be released in “better” periods
(Ohashi, 2005); vertical integration may solve contractual frictions in video game development that
allow these games to do better; another possible explanation is that publishing companies adver-
tise these games more or market them better. In summary, there are a number of reasons why
there could be diﬀerences in performance between VI games and non-VI games. Our plan here is
to establish stylized facts that confirm these diﬀerences in performance and then disentangle the
importance of the diﬀerent explanations behind the existing correlation. In trying to accomplish
this goal, we control for as many demand factors as possible that may be unrelated to the channels
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through which VI may aﬀect performance. We do this with a reduced form approach while instru-
menting for price endogeneity and using a large variety of fixed eﬀects that control for common
demand shocks that drive demand at the platform-month-year level. This allows us to establish
the channels through which VI aﬀects video game performance at the same time that we account
for the importance of network eﬀects and generation eﬀects (Corts and Lederman, 2007).
We separate our results in two groups. First, we establish cross-sectional diﬀerences in per-
formance between integrated and non-integrated games. We show that developer-publisher inte-
grated games, publisher-platform integrated games and developer-publisher-integrated games col-
lect higher revenues, and sell more units at higher prices than non-integrated games. We also show
that independent exclusive games collect lower revenues and sell less units at higher prices than
non-exclusive independent games. Second, we estimate video game demand instrumenting for price
sensitivity and show that demand for integrated video games is higher than independent games.
Demand for exclusive games is lower than independent non-exclusive games. Next we explore the
source of this diﬀerence in demand. Our results indicate that vertically integrated games are not
idiosyncratically better or higher quality. Instead, the diﬀerence in performance appears to be
mainly determined by the release and ex-post-release marketing strategies.
This result is surprising because integrated development of video games is pervasive. According
to our data, more than 47% of video games are developed by an integrated developer and vertical
acquisitions of developers are common in this industry. Then our result raises the question of
what drives vertical integration in the movie industry. As the previous literature has suggested,
network eﬀects are important in the video game industry and this would be a justification of why
publisher and platforms integrate video game development (even if it is at a cost in video game
quality) since platform demand increases. Another potential explanation more aligned with current
vertical integration theories (transaction cost economics and property right theories) is that internal
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production of games is cheaper (than outsourced production) in that there are lower transaction
costs and adaptation costs of video game development. Publishers then economize on the trade-oﬀ
between cost and quality. In other words, lower costs of game development compensate for lower
quality of these games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the vertical chain in the
video games industry. We describe our data set and its sources in section 3. Section 4 presents our
empirical methodology and preliminary findings. We explore the causal eﬀect of vertical integration
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Detail: Vertical Chains in Video Games
We focus our analysis on video games for consoles, so we first describe the console market.1 There
are three big players in this industry: Sony and its PlayStation, Microsoft and its XBOX, and
Nintendo with its Game Cube and Wii. We have recently entered the era of the 7th generation of
consoles (XBOX360, PS3, Wii). Our plan is to study the impact of vertical integration on video
game performance during the 6th generation (PS2, GameCube and XBOX) and the overlapping
period between the 6th and the 7th generations. To simplify the phrasing, we will call the three
main actors on the console market the “console companies.”
Once the console is acquired by the consumer, games are needed to complement the hardware.
The vertical chain of the production of a video game starts with the development of the game.
Developers create the content. They can either work for a publisher or be independent (third-party
developer). The publisher possesses the rights of the game and is responsible for the marketing
and the manufacturing process. An independent developer contracts with a publisher and receives
royalties. All developers also pay a licensing fee to the console companies. The console companies all
1See Williams (2002) for a detailed description of the video games industry.
5
have their own publishing company but there are also many independent publishers, like Electronic
Arts (EA). The strategic advantage for console firms to vertically integrate at this stage is that
they can preclude the development of the game for other platforms, i.e. creating games unique for
one console. This brings additional value for customers. As we will see in the data section, this
was the case of Sony for the 6th generation, and Microsoft for the 7th generation.
The manufacturing process per se obligatorily takes place at the manufacturer’s plant, owned
by the console companies. The publishers pay a fixed fee by copy of the game to the manufacturer.
The console companies earn most of their money from these licensing fees, plus their own video
games publishing and developing activities, while they break even or even lose money on the console
market.2
The video games market is considered to be a hit market, i.e. a market where sales are very
concentrated on only a few extremely successful products. For example, in December of 2007, half a
billion dollars was spent on video games for the XBOX360. Out of this, more than 150 million was
spent on only two games. Another feature of this market is seasonality since sales are concentrated
during a very specific period. This is at the end of the year, in November and December, during
the Christmas period: more than 50% of 2007 sales for the Wii and the PS3, and more than 40%
for the XBOX360 took place during that period. These are all characteristics that we have in mind
when analyzing our data below.
2The final two stages are distribution and retail. Since we do not study these two stages, we only describe them
briefly. Distributors store and deliver the product to the retailers (some publishers are integrated at this stage as
well). The retail market in the U.S. is dominated by the super stores like Wal-Mart or Toys’R Us. This stage has
remained relatively independent so far.
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3 Data Description
We acquired from NPD group (a leading marketing information provider) monthly information
on unit sales and revenues for all video games belonging to the 6th and 7th generation in the
US between October 2000 and October 2007. We then linked these data to information on video
game developer identity from several websites and industry trade publications.3 Table 1 shows
summary statistics of monthly sales, monthly revenues and monthly average prices (mainly the
result of dividing revenues by sales) and vertical integration variables that we will be using in our
empirical analysis below. See that on average a game sold at $23, sold almost 6,000 units a month
and collected $220,000 a month. Our data also shows that a game stays on its run an average of
25 months. See as well that 44% of observations are from games developed and published by the
same firm (but not platform integrated), almost 5% of observations are from games published by a
publisher owned by a platform (but not developed by the platform) and that 3% of the observations
are from games developed and published by the same platform.
We can break up these vertical integration (and exclusive of each other) variables and find out
that 53% of observations are due to games developed by integrated developer and that 88% of the
observations are due to games published by an integrated publisher (and yet not necessarily be an
integrated game). Finally, see that when we define integration at the game level non-exclusively,
developer-publisher integration increases to 47%, publisher-platform integration raises up to 8%
and that, by definition, three-way integration (developer-publisher-platform) remains at 3%.
When breaking our data set by integration status, see in the next three columns that all three
types of integration show larger averages of sales, revenues and prices (except publisher-platform
integration regarding prices) than the overall sample despite the fact that the games seem all to
3Some of these are GameStats, GameSpot, Gamasutra and for very few particularly challenging video games
wikipedia.
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last the same in the market, around 25 months.
In Table 2A we break up the sample by platform. We show that, within the consoles in the
6th generation, PS2 released over 1,500 games within this period, XBOX 800 and GameCube over
500. For consoles in the 7th generation and up to October 2007, XBOX360 had released almost 200
games for 130 of Wii and 80 of PS3. This table reports average and median monthly revenues by
console. This allows us to see that the distribution of revenues are rather skewed and, for example,
in the 6th generation, PS2 was the clear winner of all three consoles since PS2 had the most skewed
distributions of the three consoles. Up to October 2007, it is diﬃcult to say which of the three
consoles in the 7th generation is and would be the winner since all three sets of statistics are quite
similar, with a slight advantage to XBOX360.
More importantly, Table 2A also describes how vertical integration patterns vary by console.
Vertical integration seems to be more common among consoles in the 7th generation than those
in the 6th generation. This could be explained by the fact that the 7th generation is just starting
and consoles rely more on vertical integration at the beginning than at the end of the generation
run. Within the sixth generation, GameCube has the highest three-way integration average with
a 4.3% of its observations, followed by PS2 and XBOX with 3.5% and 2.3% respectively. All three
consoles have similar percentages around 40% and 45% of developer-publisher vertical integration.
The early data for the 7th generation seems to tell a diﬀerent story since PS3 is the console with
the highest three-way integrated observations around 10%. Wii follows with 6.4% and XBOX360
has 5.6%. The range of developer-publisher game integration (non-including three-way integration)
is also quite diﬀerent from the one observed in the 6th generation. Here, the lowest average is Wii
with 56% and the highest is PS3 with 68%. Finally, 62.4% of XBOX360 observations are due to
games developed and published by the same firm.
Finally, Table 2B shows the relation between our non-exclusive vertical integration variables
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and our firm level integration variables. Let us use a few examples to illustrate how these variables
work. First, imagine the case of a video game developed and published by Nintendo and played in
GameCube. In this hypothetical case, we will observe a 1 for all dummy variables,even variables
 ? and  ? Imagine now a video game developed by an
independent, published by Electronic Arts and played in GameCube. This game will have values
such that  ? = 0 and  ? = 1. On the other hand, this
game will have value equal to zero for all integrated variables in this table. Lastly, imagine the case
of a game developed by an independent, published by Nintendo and played in Wii. This game will
have values such that  ? = 0 and  ? = 1. The diﬀerence
here is that, even though the game developer-publisher integration and the three-way integration
variable will take value 0, the game publisher-platform integration variable will take value 1.
Table 2B breaks down statistics both by number of observations and number of games. Let us
focus on the bottom part of the table where we compile the number of observations at the game
level and therefore each cell contains the corresponding number of games. Out of a total of 3,385
games, 1,855 games are developed by integrated developers. Out of these 1,855 games, 233 are
not published by their publishing division. Only 163 are published by a firm owned by a platform
and only 117 are developed and published by the same platform owner. On the other hand, 2,996
out of 3,385 games are published by integrated publishers. Of these 2,996 games, 1,474 games
are developed by independent developers (independent to the integrated publisher in particular).
Similarly, 276 games are published by the owner of their platform and of these 117 (consistently
with the other piece of data) are developed and published by the console owner.
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4 Empirical Strategy and Results
We divide our empirical exploration in two diﬀerent groups. The first group estimates cross-
sectional diﬀerences between integrated and non-integrated games in our three performance mea-
sures (revenue, quantity and prices). The second group estimates demand functions where market
shares are being estimated as a function of price, number of months since release and the organi-
zational form involved in the game production and distribution.
4.1 Presenting Stylized Facts: Diﬀerences in Performance
As announced above, we have three measures of game performance through which we want to
establish stylized facts in this industry. These are the logarithm of monthly revenues, monthly unit
sales and monthly average price. We therefore start our analysis by running separate regressions
for each one of the three performance measures such that,
ln() = 0 + 1  + 2  + 3 +
+ 4 + 5 +  + ,
where ln() represents our three performance measures;   takes value 1 if game
 is produced and published by the same firm but the publisher is not integrated with platform
, and 0 otherwise;   takes value 1 if game  is published by the same firm that
owns platform  but developed by another firm, and 0 otherwise; and finally  
takes value 1 if game  is produced and published by the same firm that owns platform , and 0
otherwise. These three dummy variables are exclusive among each other. Other regressors in this
descriptive analysis are  which takes value 1 if game  is exclusive to platform  and
 which measures the number of months since game  was released. The final regressor
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 involves information regarding video game genre, platform and month-year fixed eﬀects. We
observe clear outliers in our data necessarily due to measurement error and for that reason we limit
our empirical exercise to observations with average price ranging between $5 and $60 dropping less
than 1% of the data. We show results in Tables 3 to 5.
Table 3 oﬀers results of diﬀerences in revenues. We start our empirical analysis by observing
rough empirical correlations between monthly revenues and vertical integration and exclusivity
variables. These correlations show that integrated games collect more revenues than independently
developed and published games. Column (2) adds video game age (number of months since release)
which turns to explain quite a lot of the variation in the dependent variable since we observe R-
square go from 2% to 60%. Non-surprisingly, the older a game is the lower the revenues it collects.
In the following three columns we include genre, month and platform fixed eﬀects to capture any
component specific to these categories that may be driving the observed diﬀerences in revenues.
The results are robust to the inclusion of these fixed eﬀects. Summarizing, we find that video game
vertical integration is positively correlated with higher levels of revenues. Additionally, we also find
that video game exclusivity is negatively correlated with weekly revenues.
In Table 4, we undertake the same analysis as in the previous table but this time we use the
number of units sold by month and video game as dependent variable. Similarly to Table 3, we
find that vertically integrated games sell more units than independently developed and published
games, even after controlling for video game age, and video game genre, month and platform fixed
eﬀects. We also find that video game exclusivity is negatively correlated with unit sales once we
take into account whether a game is developed and published under the same structure.
Finally, Table 5 oﬀers results of pursuing the same type of analysis with average monthly prices
(revenues divided by units sold) as dependent variable. Once again we find that vertically integrated
games perform better, in this case, sell at higher prices than independently developed and published
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games. Contrary to findings above, exclusivity is positively correlated with higher prices.
These results show that there are diﬀerences in performance across games developed and pub-
lished under diﬀerent organizational forms. In particular, we found that vertically integrated games
produce higher revenues, sell more units and sell at higher prices than independently developed
and published games. In addition to this, and not central to our paper (but important to other
papers in the literature), we found that games independently developed and published games that
are exclusive to a platform produce less revenues, sell less units and sell at higher prices than non-
exclusive independent games. In the next section, we will uncover how much of these cross-sectional
diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in pricing and how much due to diﬀerences in consumer demand
correlated with quality (perceived or real) and organizational form.
4.2 Demand Estimation Methodology and Results
Once established above that vertically integrated games perform better, we now turn to demand es-
timation to first check that the results above survive the introduction of structure in the estimation.
Here we follow the spirit of Lee (2009) in that we minimize the role of substitution across games
and focus on substitution across platforms when specifying video game demand. For this reason,
we start by modeling video game demand as a binary discrete choice problem, that is, consumer
 either buys game  or she does not. This decision is assumed to be separate from buying other
games. Let us assume then that the utility that consumer  obtains from buying (and playing)
video game  in period  is
 =  +  +  + (− ) +  + 
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where  is an error term identically and independently distributed distributed across consumers
with the extreme value distribution function (−(−). Consider  as the mean utility of
video game  in period  such that
 =  +  +  + (− ) + 
where  are observed game characteristics (that may change across time),  is the video game
price,  are unobservable quality characteristics, (− ) is capturing a trend that makes outside
option more attractive as time passes by from the release of video game   , and 0 is an unobserved
time-variant utility component common to all consumer. Given this decomposition of the average
utility of a video game per period, we then can rewrite the utility function above as
 =  + 
On the other hand, the alternative option to buying video game  is not to buy video game .
The utility of this option can be characterized as follows
0 = 0,
where 0 is an error term also distributed with the extreme value distribution. The well-know
logit formula provides solution for the market share of game  in period . In this case, this market
share is just the share of the population at risk that buys the video game as opposed to not buying
it. The solution specifies that
 = exp()
1 + exp()
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and
0 = 1
1 + exp() .
Then we can apply logs and substract each other to obtain
ln() =  =  +  +  + (− ) + 
which we can estimate with our data even if we cannot observe a few variables ( and ), as well
as imperfectly measure others ( and ). At this point, the inclusion of fixed eﬀects will be
of great service to control for these unobservables that may influence pricing and therefore create
a bias in the estimation of the coeﬃcient . In this paper, we are not mainly interested in the
estimation of  but rather the possible correlation of vertical integration with a few characteristics
poorly measured by  and  . This will help us understand the value and source of the impact
of vertical integration on video game demand.
For this purpose, we run the following regression equation
ln() = 0 + 1_ + 1 + 2 (     )+
+
85X
=1
2 +
85X
=1
3 +
85X
=1
3X
=1
4 + .
In this specification, the dependent variable follows the analysis in Lee (2009) in that  =

− where  is the number of units sold by game  of platform  in month  of year
,  is the total number of platforms  sold up to month  of year  and  is the total
number of units sold of game  for platform  before month  of year . Therefore, the dependent
variable is the share of consumers at risk of buying game  for platform  that actually buy the game
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in month  of year . The right-hand side of this regression equation does not diﬀer much than
a typical demand equation. Since we do not observe individual transactions but rather aggregate
revenues and unit sales per game, platform and month-year, we use average price per video game
and platform _ per month as our price variable.
Then we add observable game characteristics in  such as genre fixed eﬀects to control
for vertical diﬀerences across games and finally we add our main variables of interest: the game-
specific vertical relation controls. These supply variables are , ,  ,
 ,   and . Let us now define each one of these variables: 
takes value 1 if the developer of game  is integrated and 0 otherwise;  takes value 1
if the publisher of game  is integrated into development and 0 otherwise;   takes value
1 if game  is distributed by a publisher integrated with its developer and 0 otherwise;  
takes value 1 if game  is distributed by a publisher integrated with its platform but not with
its developer and 0 otherwise,   takes value 1 if game  is distributed by a publisher
integrated with its platform and its developer; and finally  takes value 1 if game  is
exclusive to platform . Since we are after the estimation of 2, theoretically we do not care if price
is endogenous as long as it does not aﬀect the coeﬃcients on the vertical control variables. We
understand that video game pricing is not exogenously determined and will be correlated with a
number of dimensions of the unobserved heterogeneity aﬀecting the problem of publishers. For this
reason, in our specifications we use as instrument the per genre and platform average number of
months that takes the price of a video game go down to 60% of its original highest price at release.
This variable is positively correlated with observed average monthly prices and uncorrelated with
monthly observed market shares since we are taking averages over all games within a genre and
platform.4 After instrumenting, we start using game and month/year fixed eﬀects and unbundle
4We have also used other instruments for _. The first instrument follows Lee (2009) with lagged prices of
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little by little this unobserved heterogeneity allowing us to observe how organizational form may
be correlated with vertical diﬀerentiation across games that ultimately drives demand up or down.
Aside from this, we control for game age (months since release) using dummy variables 2
and month-year fixed eﬀects 3. Finally, we introduce month-year-platform fixed eﬀects 4 to
control for platform specific intertemporal substitution. Our specifications may also use other fixed
eﬀects at the platform or month level, but the set of fixed eﬀects presented above will capture
the unobservable seasonality and platform specific heterogeneity that the rest of controls cannot
account for. We proceed next in Table 6 to show the results of estimating this demand equation.
Similarly to results in Tables 3 to 5, we only use observations with average price ranging between
$5 and $60.
Table 6 shows results of the empirical strategy above. Column (1) shows the raw correlation
between average price and market share after controlling for age and month-year fixed eﬀects.
In column (2) we use game-platform fixed eﬀects to control for all the unobserved heterogeneity
hidden in the error term and correlated with pricing decisions. The price coeﬃcient is now −00295
and is larger than the coeﬃcient in column (1) and statistically significant at 1% level. These two
specifications also include age fixed eﬀects and month-year fixed eﬀects.
In column (3) we instrument for price while using separate game and platform fixed eﬀects.
The price coeﬃcient increases to −00881 and is now significant at 10% level. Our price coeﬃcient
has lost statistical significance because our instrument does not have variation across games within
genre and platform and we are clustering our standard errors by game-platform dyad. In columns
(4) to (6), we add to the specification our set of vertical relation variables (vertical integration
and exclusivity) with the same set of fixed eﬀects as in column (3) and others. According to the
a video game in a given platform. The second instrument that we use is the average price per game in that platform
in that period for all games released in the same month as game . These instruments do not seem to solve the
endogeneity problem and therefore we do not show those results here in this paper.
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specification in column (4), holding game and platform constant, it seems that vertical integration
is only positively correlated with demand when this takes place between developer and publisher
or between publisher and platform. Exclusivity is negatively correlated with demand.
In columns (5) and (6), we introduce integrated developer and publisher dummies to con-
trol for firm size and substitute game fixed eﬀects by platform and genre fixed eﬀects and plat-
form/month/year and genre fixed eﬀects respectively. Opening the game fixed eﬀects allows us to
know more about how video game organizational form is correlated with the determinants of its
demand. These two specifications yield similar results. The price coeﬃcient drops to values around
−005 and remains statisticaly insignificant mainly due to game level clustering. Other results in-
dicate that games published by integrated publishers do better than independent games regardless
of whether their developer and publisher are integrated with each other. In addition to this, if the
publisher and developer of the game are integrated with each other, or the publisher is integrated
with the game’s platform, the game does better than otherwise. Similarly to results in specification
(4) we also find that non-exclusive independent games perform better than exclusive independent
games.
Once we have established that there exist diﬀerences in demand for games produced and mar-
keted under organizational forms, we test for the origin of these diﬀerences. One may be concerned
that our vertical control variables are correlated with unobserved variables that drive sales at
the game-platform-month level (our observational unit) since the existing literature oﬀers several
instances that document so. Nair (2007) shows that ex-post release promotional activities and mar-
keting strategies in the video game industry may increase demand. Ohashi (2005) shows evidence
that publishers release their internally developed games further apart in time than they do with
their independently developed games. Finally, it may be that integrated games are diﬀerent in that
their design and development adjust better to market trends and platform capabilities. We explore
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the importance of these diﬀerent factors for video game performance in the next section.
5 Exploring the Causal Eﬀect of VI
Once established in the previous section that there is an empirical relation between vertical inte-
gration and video game performance and demand, we proceed to consider what are the causes of
such empirical correlation. In summary, there are three stages in the life of a game through which
vertical integration could play an important role. These are the developing stage, the publishing
and release stage and finally the post-release stage. This eﬀect could come from the fact that
publishing companies do a better job at promoting their own games after release, do a better job
at choosing the optimal time of release (by softening competition) or do a better job at developing
games in terms of design and matching with demand trends and platform capabilities. We next
explore the role of these three potential explanations by directly investigating the role of the former
two and interpreting the residual eﬀect as supporting evidence for the latter.
Table 7 explores the relative importance of these explanations. Column (1) in Table 7 shows the
same specification as column (6) in Table 6, while column (2) relaxes platform-month-year joint fixed
eﬀects and introduces developer and publisher fixed eﬀects with same qualitative results. Games
developed and published by the same company and games published by platform companies have
higher demand than independent games. The impact of exclusivity on demand is still negative but
not statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) help us disentangle the importance of the three
explanations briefly outlined above.
As mentioned above, one possible way in which publishers may aﬀect performance of their
internally developed games relative to the games that they distribute but developed by others is by
providing more eﬀective marketing strategies and promotional activities after the game is released
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(better targeted marketing campaigns or more advertising).
To explore the relevance of this potential explanation, we introduce game-platform fixed eﬀects.
By doing this, we are able to identify changes in demand due to changes in the game’s organizational
form during its run and after its release. We devoted great eﬀorts to include all acquisitions and
mergers during the span of time that our data spans. Therefore we are confident that after including
game-platform fixed eﬀects the changes in performance are due to changes in marketing strategies
that occur after a change in organizational form after the release of the game and during its run.
Since our instrument has limited variation at the platform-genre level, we run OLS regression in this
specification confident that the game-platform fixed eﬀect captures all unobservable characteristics
idiosyncratic to the game-platform level and that may aﬀect pricing.
We show the results of exploring this explanation in column (3) of Table 7. According to our
results, changes in developer or publisher integration status without a change in game integration
status are associated with a negative and positive change in demand respectively. This is consistent
(although not a direct test) with implications from Grossman and Hart (1986) in that, immediately
after integration, the acquired firm will experience a decline in performance while the acquiring
firm will increase its performance.
Additionally, we now observe that a game’s demand increases by 16 percentage points once
the game becomes developer-publisher integrated. This is evidence that one of the integration
benefits in this industry comes from better marketing strategies even after the release period. On
the other hand, we do not observe any diﬀerence in demand due to three-way integration and no
game experienced a change in publisher-platform integration status since no publisher belonging to
a platform merged or acquired other publishers during the period of study. Exclusivity again shifts
demand down during the run of a video game.
Another potential explanation for the impact of vertical integration on video game performance
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is that publishers coordinate better the release of their own games than the release of video game
developed by others. Ohashi (2005) empirically examines how release strategies diﬀer for games
distributed by publishers whether these own their developers. He finds that integrated games are
released further apart in time than non-integrated games. In other words, publishers soften com-
petition for their internally developed games more than they do for their independently developed
games and therefore increase sales for vertically integrated games.
We explore this possibility by adapting our demand estimation methodology. Note that our
initial empirical strategy implicitly follows Lee (2009) and assumes that there is no substitution
across games while focusing on the intertemporal substitution across platforms as the main deterrent
of current game purchases. Evidence in Ohashi (2005) and Derdenger (2008) suggests otherwise
and substitution across games must be considered when studying video game demand. For our
purposes, vertical integration may play an important role if integrated publishers do better at
softening competition for their own games than non-integrated publishers are.
To examine the importance of this potential explanation, we follow in spirit the empirical
methodology of Ohashi (2005). In his paper, he measures the amount of competition that each
game faces within its genre and across genres and empirically relates that to whether the game’s
publisher is integrated with its platform. Here, instead of creating competition variables that
would account for softer competition of vertically integrated games, we introduce fixed eﬀects that
will implicitly do the same function with the advantage that using fixed eﬀects allows us to add
nonlinearities that otherwise would be ignored if we just included a linear regressor. In particular,
in column (4) of Table 7, we introduce platform-month-year-genre-age fixed eﬀects. We can use
this vast number of fixed eﬀects because of the richness of our dataset. Importantly this allows us
to control for diﬀerences in game competition within genre released in any given month. Any eﬀect
of vertical integration found in these specifications may be due to correlations of vertical diﬀerences
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between games and diﬀerences in organizational form across games. Similarly to the specification
in column (3), our multidimensional fixed eﬀect eats up the limited variation in our instrument and
therefore we run a simple OLS regression.
The results in this last column of Table 7 shows the eﬀect of vertical integration after controlling
for changes in competition. To make sense of these results we need to compare these results to those
in columns (1) and (3) of Table 7. In column (1) of Table 7 the coeﬃcient on − 
is +025. This same coeﬃcient in column (3) is +016. This means that there are 9 percentage
points that are left unexplained and that could be due to better quality games or less competition
faced by vertically integrated games. Column (4) in Table 7 yields a coeﬃcient of +016 that
lacks statistical significance. The combination of the results in these two columns basically imply
that better release strategies explain 16 extra percentage points in performance, that the quality
of integrated games is the same as that of independently developed and published games and that
softening competition through coordinated release explains the remaining 8 percentage points in
extra demand.
The eﬀect of publisher and platform integration is diﬃcult to disentangle with our empirical
methodology. The results in column (1) of Table 7 indicate that this type of integration is associated
with an increase of+142 percentage points extra in demand. We cannot determine what percentage
of this correlation is due to better marketing strategies since there is no variation in our data at the
game level. Instead, we do observe that in column (4) of Table 7 the coeﬃcient jumps up to +174
percentage points. This implies that accounting for softer competition at release does not diminish
the eﬀect. If anything, it diminishes demand by 22 percentage points indicating that this eﬀect
is not important for release of games published by the platform themselves. This leaves the joint
eﬀect of higher quality and better marketing strategies (post-release) at a positive +174. Since
this type of integration does not include the developing stage, it may be safe to attribute the entire
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magnitude of this coeﬃcient to better marketing strategies.
When it comes to exploring the eﬀect of three-way integration with a platform, we observe that
the results go from a non-statistically significant −024 coeﬃcient on the three-way interaction in
column (3) to a statistically significant −082 in column (4). In column (1) this coeﬃcient takes
value −026 and not statistically significant. This would mean that games that are three-way
integrated have on average 82 percentage points less of demand and that the ability of coordinating
better their release and softening initial competition boosts up their demand by nearly 56 percentage
points.
The evidence from Table 7 shows that both ex-post promotional activities and release month
decisions are plausible explanations for the total impact of vertical integration on video game
performance. The question now is whether vertical integration has any eﬀect in the developing
stage and prior to release stage that translates into better performance along the life cycle of the
game. We address this concern above when we talk about the residual impact of vertical integration
on the quality of the games.
Table 8 provides a summary of the impact of all three causal explanations of vertical integration
on video game demand. In this table, we also use the coeﬃcient on average price to make "back
of the envelope" calculations of how much consumers value game characteristics correlated with
vertical integration. If anything, we find that on average games internally produced are of lower
quality than those produced by independent developers. On average, consumers value vertical
integrated games between $4 and $34 dollars more than independent games. Post-release marketing
strategies increase willingness to pay by $5.5 in developer-publisher integrated games and release
strategies increase willingness to pay by $66 in developer-publisher-platform integrated games.
There does not seem to be a relation between vertical integration and video game quality that
translates into higher willingness to pay for a game.
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These results are, at least to us, surprising and open the question of why publishers and plat-
forms integrate at all into development, and more so, why these acquire developers that otherwise
they could be producing “better games” at arm length’s transactions. A possible reason why we
observe this eﬀect at the development and prior to release stage is that developers and publishers
incur lower adaptation costs once they become integrated. Another possibility could be that they
achieve better coordination at the same cost or even that integrated publisher represent the result
of a better (endogenous) match between publishers and developers within the same company than
the match of independent firms working together. Finally, another potential explanation is that
network eﬀects matter and that integrated publishers and platforms really care about the number
of games they release every year since that will determine their bargaining position with platforms
and will determine the platform demand itself.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically examine the relation between vertical integration and video game
performance in the US. We do this in two significant ways. First we provide stylized facts regard-
ing performance diﬀerences across games with diﬀerent organizational forms. Second, we estimate
video game demand and relate diﬀerences in video game demand due to diﬀerences in video game
organizational form. Once we do this, we attempt to evaluate the causes of the impact of vertical
integration on video game demand by diﬀerentiating three possible sources: better marketing strate-
gies ex-post video game release, better timing of video game release strategies and/or inherently
higher quality of video games.
Our results indicate that the superior performance of integrated games is mainly due to softer
competition at release and better post-release marketing strategies. In particular, we find post-
release marketing strategies to boost video game demand by a maximum of 16 percentage points
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and softer competition at release to increase demand between 8 and 108 percentage points. Surpris-
ingly, our results suggest that video games developed and published by the same firm are not better
than those independently developed and published. If anything, these integrated video games are
inherently worse than independent games, ceteris paribus. Related to the literature on platform de-
mand and exclusivity, we also found that video game exclusivity is negatively correlated with video
game demand once we account for the existing vertical relations between developers, publishers
and platforms.
These results are surprising and may have direct implications not only for understanding the role
of vertical integration in innovation but also for research on management in innovative industries.
Had network eﬀects been absent, these findings seem to indicate that this industry would be less
integrated and more atomized than its currently status. This is consistent with observed trends in
other innovative industries where outsourcing innovation seems to be the way to conduct research
and other uncertain process that may drive costs up too high.
Despite the eﬀorts in the current article, we left many windows open to stir discussion and
for future research. For instance, we did not address the endogeneity of the vertical integration
variable nor why we observe mergers, acquisitions and takeovers in this industry during the 7 years
that our data spans. In the future, we will examine this research question while relying in results in
the current research to shed light more generally on what drives organizational form in innovative
industries. The object of this future research should be of interest not only to those interested in
the video game industry and other innovative and creative industries but also those interested in
the management of innovation and the economics of contracts.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Performance Outcomes and Vertical Integration Variables
All obs. If VertInt Dev-Pub If VertInt Pub-Platf If VertInt Dev-Pub-Platf
Monthly Revenues 220172.3 274473.4 350968.8 609629.9
(1449824) (1651469) (1597786) (3604588)
Average Monthly Price 22.9 25.6 22.9 24.3
(12.0) (12.6) (14.1) (13.6)
Monthly Units Sold 5946.3 7217.0 9071.9 14926.1
(29587.0) (34419.9) (31843.6) (67409.6)
Age 25.0 25.0 26.5 26.0
(18.1) (18.3) (18.6) (18.8)
Vertical Integration Variables
VertInt Dev-Pub? 44.03% 100% - -
VertInt Pub-Platf? 4.67% - 100% -
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platf? 3.41% - - 100%
Integrated Developer? 53.31% 100% 17.13% 100%
Integrated Publisher? 88.43% 92.40% 100% 100%
Game Int Dev-Pub? 47.40% 100% 0% 100%
Game Int Pub-Platf? 8.30% 0% 100% 100%
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platf? 3.41% 0% 0% 100%
Note: This table provides summary statistics for three performance outcome variables, revenues, price and units sold. It also provides 
statistics for vertical integration variables used in our empirical methodology. Note that the first three variables are exclusive of each 
other whereas the last three are inclusive. We use the former three to establish cross-sectional differences among games and the 
latter three for our more detailed analysis that will shed light on how vertical integration impacts game performance.
Table 2A. Summary Statistics by Platform
PS2 XBOX GC XBOX360 WII PS3
Number of Games 1,509 884 546 196 131 79
VertInt Dev-Pub? 43.60% 41.80% 46% 62.40% 56.10% 68%
VertInt Pub-Platf? 4.21% 5.70% 4.10% 4.90% 3.80% 8.30%
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platf? 3.50% 2.30% 4.30% 5.60% 6.40% 10.20%
Average Monthly Revenues $242,427 $146,064 $146,302 $1,279,729 $1,128,127 $966,132
Median Monthly Revenues $9,457 $8,026 $7,351 $246,662 $281,610 $382,909
Min Monthly Revenues $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,902
Max Monthly Revenues $100,879,300 $87,669,040 $40,956,360 $141,363,100 $25,502,900 $20,031,190
Number Obs. 63,692 37,543 24,915 2,073 734 459
    
Note: This table provides summary statistics of most important variables. This is useful to present key differences across platforms in terms of
number of games released, vertical integration patterns and average and median monthly revenues.
Table 2B. More Descriptive Statistics for Vertical Integration Variables
By Observation
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Integrated Developer? No 60,428 0 55,421 5,007 60,428 0
Yes 7,600 61,388 63,233 5,755 64,579 4,409
Integrated Publisher? No 10,624 4,342 14,966 0 14,966 0
Yes 57,404 57,046 103,688 10,762 110,041 4,409
By Game
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Integrated Developer? No 1,530 0 1,417 113 1,530 0
Yes 233 1,622 1,692 103 1,738 117
Integrated Publisher? No 289 100 389 0 389 0
Yes 1474 1,522 2,720 276 2,879 117
Note: This table offers cross-tabulations of vertical integration variables by weekly observation (top of the table) and by video
game (bottom of the table). From these, one may be able to construct VertInt Dev-Pub, Pub-Platf and Dev-Pub-Platf.
Game Int Dev-Pub? Game Int Pub-Platf? Game Int Dev-Pub-Platf?
Game Int Dev-Pub? Game Int Pub-Platf? Game Int Dev-Pub-Platf?
Table 3. Empirical Relation Between Vertical Integration and Monthly Video Game Revenues
Dep Var: log(revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VertInt Dev-Pub 0.4721 0.4745 0.5625 0.5345 0.5196
(0.0586)*** (0.0574)*** (0.0588)*** (0.0574)*** (0.0564)***
VertInt Pub-Platform 1.2459 1.4287 1.5106 1.5399 1.5933
(0.1476)*** (0.1400)*** (0.1329)*** (0.1322)*** (0.1303)***
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platform 1.5317 1.6297 1.7846 1.8069 1.8459
(0.2051)*** (0.2049)*** (0.1896)*** (0.1805)*** (0.1919)***
Exclusivity -0.1629 -0.0209 -0.0640 -0.2308 -0.3591
(0.0598)*** (0.0504) (0.0489) (0.0547)*** (0.0558)***
Age -0.1182 -0.1183 -0.1106 -0.1087
(0.0012)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0017)***
Constant 9.1073 11.8195 11.7972 12.2475 11.9890
(0.0503)*** (0.0501)*** (0.0486)*** (0.1322)*** (0.1404)***
Genre FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform FE No No No No Yes
Observations 122069 122069 122069 122069 122069
R-squared 0.02 0.6 0.63 0.65 0.66
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by game-platform dyad.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4. Empirical Relation Between Vertical Integration and Monthly Video Game Sales
Dep Var: log(quantity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VertInt Dev-Pub 0.3813 0.3834 0.4616 0.4459 0.4351
(0.0559)*** (0.0552)*** (0.0563)*** (0.0556)*** (0.0549)***
VertInt Pub-Platform 1.2009 1.3574 1.4403 1.4712 1.5178
(0.1367)*** (0.1321)*** (0.1264)*** (0.1261)*** (0.1257)***
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platform 1.4364 1.5203 1.6474 1.6765 1.7193
(0.1809)*** (0.1843)*** (0.1719)*** (0.1665)*** (0.1771)***
Exclusivity -0.2764 -0.1548 -0.1692 -0.2970 -0.4128
(0.0557)*** (0.0483)*** (0.0467)*** (0.0529)*** (0.0542)***
Age -0.1012 -0.1012 -0.0963 -0.0946
(0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0017)***
Constant 6.2613 8.5831 8.5489 9.0342 8.7639
(0.0478)*** (0.0471)*** (0.0458)*** (0.1274)*** (0.1359)***
Genre FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform FE No No No No Yes
Observations 122069 122069 122069 122069 122069
R-squared 0.02 0.55 0.58 0.6 0.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by game-platform dyad.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5. Empirical Relation Between Vertical Integration and Average Monthly Video Game Price
Dep Var: log(average price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VertInt Dev-Pub 0.0907 0.0911 0.1008 0.0886 0.0845
(0.0105)*** (0.0102)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0097)***
VertInt Pub-Platform 0.0450 0.0713 0.0703 0.0687 0.0756
(0.0250)* (0.0227)*** (0.0217)*** (0.0220)*** (0.0201)***
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platform 0.0953 0.1094 0.1373 0.1304 0.1266
(0.0344)*** (0.0311)*** (0.0269)*** (0.0248)*** (0.0250)***
Exclusivity 0.1135 0.1339 0.1052 0.0661 0.0537
(0.0106)*** (0.0095)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0098)***
Age -0.0170 -0.0171 -0.0143 -0.0142
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Constant 2.8460 3.2364 3.2483 3.2134 3.2251
(0.0088)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0229)*** (0.0248)***
Genre FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform FE No No No No Yes
Observations 122069 122069 122069 122069 122069
R-squared 0.02 0.37 0.4 0.46 0.46
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by game-platform dyad.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6. Video Game Demand Estimation Accounting for Vertical Integration Characteristics
Dep Var: log(Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Average Price -0.0015 -0.0295 -0.0881 -0.0637 -0.0484 -0.0577
(0.0027) (0.0016)*** (0.0544)* (0.0523) (0.0528) (0.0532)
Integrated Developer 0.1029 0.0950
(0 0876) (0 0869). .
Integrated Publisher 0.3847 0.3811
(0.0898)*** (0.0907)***
Game Int Dev-Pub 0.3840 0.2607 0.2547
(0.0555)*** (0.0912)*** (0.0908)***
Game Int Pub-Platform 1.5075 1.4108 1.4267
(0 1411)*** (0 1424)*** (0 1420)***. . .
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platform -0.2674 -0.2324 -0.2604
(0.2460) (0.2460) (0.2416)
Exclusivity -0.4370 -0.3795 -0.3837
(0.0555)*** (0.0572)*** (0.0599)***
Constant -7.3932 -10.1737 -5.5180 -6.0403 -6.7698 -10.2551
(0 2328)*** (0 2048)*** (1 1932)*** (1 1476)*** (1 1593)*** (1 1706)***. . . . . .
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Game-Platform FE No Yes No No No No
Game FE No No Yes Yes No No
Pl tf FE N N Y Y Y Na orm o o es es es o
Genre FE No No No No Yes Yes
Platform-Month FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 121791 121791 121482 121482 121482 121482
R-squared 0.61 0.9 0.6 0.63 0.63 0.64
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by game-platform dyad.
The instrument used for average price in 2SLS regressions is the average time in months to decrease to 60% of maximum price
by platform and genre. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 7. The Impact of Vertical Integration on Video Game Demand: Development versus Marketing
Dep Var: log(Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Average Price -0.0577 -0.0333 -0.0298 -0.0134
(0.0532) (0.0592) (0.0016)*** (0.0055)**
Integrated Developer 0.0950 -0.4655 -0.1706 0.3836
(0.0869) (0.1058)*** (0.0999)* (0.2025)*
Integrated Publisher 0.3811 -0.3626 0.2550 0.3787
(0.0907)*** (0.1578)** (0.1512)* (0.1947)*
Game Int Dev-Pub 0.2547 0.7515 0.1635 0.1672
(0.0907)*** (0.1245)*** (0.1044)* (0.1986)
Game Int Pub-Platform 1.4267 2.0648 - 1.7434
(0.1420)*** (0.4818)*** - (0.3421)***
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platform -0.2604 -0.3120 -0.2450 -0.8259
(0.2416) (0.3243) (0.4588) (0.4807)*
Exclusivity -0.3837 -0.0909 -0.1643 -0.5384
(0.0599)*** (0.0557) (0.0385)*** (0.1371)***
Constant -10.2551 -7.5844 -10.2812 -9.0032
(1.1706)*** (1.4595)*** (0.2515)*** (0.2378)***
Age FE Yes Yes Yes No
Platform-Month FE Yes No No No
Month-Year FE No Yes Yes No
Developer FE No Yes No No
Publisher FE No Yes No No
Game-Platform FE No No Yes No
Platform-Month-Genre-Age FE No No No Yes
Observations 121482 120955 121791 121791
R-squared 0.64 0.75 0.9 0.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered by game-platform dyad.
The instrument used for average price in 2SLS regressions is the average time in months to decrease to 60% of
Table 8. Exploring the Causal Effect of Vertical Integration on Video Game Demand
(1) (4) (5)
Joint Effect Net Quality 
Effect
Net Release 
Period Effect
Column (1) Table 7 (3)-(2) (1)-(3)
Game Int Dev-Pub β 0.2547 0.0037 0.0874
0.0907 0.2244 0.2182
USD 4.4146 7.0334 -8.1111
4.3670 16.1306 16.3361
Game Int Pub-Platform β 1.4267 0† -0.3168
0.1420 - 0.3703
USD 24.7322 0† -105.8484
22.9572 - 32.4664
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platform β 0.2604 -0.5809 1.0862
0.2416 0.6645 0.5379
USD 4 5136 53 6263 66 3693
0.1672
0.1986
130.5806
22.9572
-61 8556
3.5212 15.7416
- 0.3421
0.4588 0.4807
0†
-
-0.2450
(2) (3)
0†
Post‐Release Mktg 
Strategies Effect
Column (3) Table 7
5.4923
0.1635
0.1045
Mktg Strategies + Quality 
Effect
-0.8259
Column (4) Table 7
12.5257
1.7434
8 2293. - . .
5.9073 46.7261 44.5022
Exclusivity β -0.3837 -0.3741 0.1548
0.0599 0.1424 0.1496
USD -6.6512 -34.8071 33.6760
6.2255 19.5750 20.4982
Note: Numbers in columns of 4: top number is coefficient and % impact on market share. Third number is back of the envelope calculation
result of dividing coefficient by corresponding price coefficient. Standard errors appear in small font size. Significant coefficients appear in bold.
†Note that we cannot disentangle the effect of marketing strategies and quality effect because we do not recover coefficient in column (2).
0.0385
.
44.1084
-0.5384
0.1371
-5.5201 -40.3272
1.3269 19.5299
- .
15.4201
-0.1643
